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Abstract- In today’s corporate IT systems there is an undeniable pattern that is routinely repeated by 
employees: access to a huge number of password-protected services. In this regard, though deploying 
a strong enterprise password policy is a mean to increase security against online breaches and data 
leaks, it also imposes a significant usability burden for users. To alleviate this problem, Password 
Managers (PMs) are pointed out as user-friendly tools that automate the processes of password 
generation and login. But how secure and usable are these tools? In this paper we analyze the four 
most popular PMs with free version from both security and usability perspectives. The comparison 
leads to recommendations on enterprise PM selection, as well as to the identification of new lines of 
research and development on usable authentication. 
Introduction 
Nowadays, we are constantly asked to prove our digital identities: e.g., when performing a check in 
for a flight, for concluding a purchase via credit card, or in order to log onto a computer or secure 
web site. This panorama does not change inside corporate walls, where employees need to daily 
access a huge number of services, whether on-premises, or cloud hosted, or run by partner 
companies, etc. To face this mental burden of managing an increasing number of accounts and 
passwords, it is common for users to devise dangerous password strategies, such as reuse or writing 
down. These bad habits may cause harm to individuals, but the impact is much worse for companies, 
where a breach on an employee password may leak highly sensitive data and cause important 
business and reputation damages. These stories have been front page news in recent years [1] and so 
companies are taking measures, being the implantation of strict password policies the most popular 
one. Generally, best practices and recommendation guidelines for password policies [2] [3]  include 
restrictions on minimum length and charsets, imposing frequent changes and prohibiting reuse. 
Despite these mechanisms should imply an increase on security, studies unveil that the stricter the 
policies, the more are users prone to develop insecure practices in order to cope with the mental 
burden these policies may impose [4] . 
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Some new authentication approaches have emerged to provide more security, such as  those relying 
on Single Sign-On (SSO) protocols (see “Related Work” for details), but since passwords continue to 
dominate the authentication landscape, Password Managers (PMs) are an alternative for immediate 
adoption without important infrastructure modifications. PMs automate generation of passwords 
and login processes, which has a direct impact in economic benefits: on the one hand, it reduces the 
costs of helpdesk calls related to password issues; and on the other hand it minimizes the time 
employees dedicate to tasks that are not related to their work (login tasks are considered 
interruptions). 
Considering the above mentioned benefits brought by PMs and the recent studies recommending to 
use these tools [5] , we wanted to evaluate the real security and usability levels of the most popular 
PMs. The goal of this paper is therefore to perform a comparative analysis, based on expert 
knowledge and empirical studies with users, and also to derive new directions towards secure and 
usable authentication schemes for enterprise environments. 
 
Related Work- SSO Protocols and Smart Authentication Clients  
The traditional silo-based identity scheme, where users are requested to set up one login per service, has 
become inefficient for the current demands of cross-organization cooperation, partnership and collaboration.  
In order to cope with the identity problems, such as unmanageability and scalability, that arise in current 
distributed ecosystems there are several technological mechanisms that can be classified into two categories:  
On the one hand, SSO protocols are oriented to provide credential reuse functionality, i.e., a user 
authenticates once and gains access to multiple sites without having to re-authenticate again because 
information is transmitted between all the involved parties in a seamless manner. Based on this Single Sign-
on concept, this last decade witnessed the development of a number of identity protocols built around web 
services and beyond [1], which include SAML, OpenID Connect and OAuth. The problem with SSO 
protocols is that the involved parties must create a Circle of Trust before authentication data can be shared. 
Thus, since it is impossible to have a unique federation where all services trust one party for authentication, 
users end up being part of different federations and so having to actively authenticate many times. The 
interesting thing would be to combine and complement SSO technologies with mechanisms that enhance 
password-based authentication. 
On the other hand, there are a group of proposals dedicated to alleviate the number of repetitive tasks when 
managing multiple accounts by moving this load to devices that become smart authentication clients. The 
most salient work on this line is PICO [2] [1] , which envisions users carrying a dedicated authentication 
device that stores all user cryptographic secrets or credentials and performs automatic logins to web 
applications and other protected systems on behalf of the user based on a new protocol. But the most 
promising research lines are those centered on implicit authentication [2] , whose foundations lie on 
determining user authentication by analyzing behavioral patterns. The main problem of PICO to be adopted 
in the short term is that it requires important software modifications on services, aiming at totally replacing 
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password-based authentication. In turn, implicit authentication allows for a better session management by 
detecting user presence, but neither does it completely eliminate multiple password-based logins. Therefore, 
the most realistic strategy nowadays is the adoption of Password Managers (PMs), which are software 
programs that are able to automatically fill password-based login forms and can be used in conjunction with 
SSO protocols and implicit authentication solutions.  
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Comparison of Password Managers 
A Password Manager is a software application that aids users in creating, storing, and organizing 
passwords. Basically, the application creates a local database to save all user passwords, which are 
encrypted in order to guarantee an adequate protection level.  Thus, the user just needs to memorize 
a single, ideally very strong password, the Master Key, which grants user access to the entire 
password database. Additionally, many PMs include extra functionalities to improve usability, such 
as browser plugins to automatically fill login forms on behalf of the user, or synchronization of the 
password database among multiple user devices based on cloud server storage. 
Among all the existing PM software, there are four that outstand because of their popularity: 
Dashlane, KeePass, 1Password and LastPass. Next, we focus on the analysis and comparison of these 
four applications.  
Usability Analysis  
For the usability study we consider the set of evaluation criteria known as the 5 E’s [4] According to 
this, usable software must be: 
 Efficient. Efficiency can be described as the speed (with accuracy) in which users can complete 
the tasks for which they use the product.  
 Effective: Effectiveness is the completeness and accuracy with which users achieve specified 
goals. It is determined by looking at whether the user’s goals were met successfully and 
whether all work is correct. 
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 Engaging: An interface is engaging if it is pleasant and satisfying to use. The visual design is 
the most obvious element of this characteristic. Equally important is the style of the 
interaction which might range from a game-like simulation to a simple menu-command 
system. 
 Easy to learn: An interface which is easy to learn allows users to build on their knowledge 
without deliberate effort.  
 Error tolerant: An error tolerant program is designed to prevent errors caused by the user’s 
interaction, and to help the user in recovering from any errors that do occur. 
Based on this set of criteria, the usability of the four PMs was tested empirically through 
questionnaires with real users. The questionnaires were structured around a set of tasks based on a 
pioneering study that analyzed two emerging PMs in 2006 [7] . These tasks, which cover the main 
functionalities of a PM, are described in the list below: 
 Task 1 – Initialization: register with the PM software and store a couple of personal 
passwords associated to frequently visited websites. 
 Task 2 – Log in: start a session in a website for which the PM has a stored password. 
 Task 3 – Remote Log in:  start a session in a website for which the PM has a stored password 
using a different user device. This task serves to understand portability and synchronization 
between devices in the user’s personal network. 
 Task 4 – Password change: use the PM to change a personal password for a particular 
website. 
 Task 5 – Log in with changed password: complete a log in procedure after a password 
change. 
Each respondent followed the set of tasks for each of the 4 PMs under study and gave an evaluation 
regarding the usability criteria. For rating each criterion, participants were presented with a 7-
dimension Likert scale containing labels: “Totally Satisfied -TS”, “Very Satisfied -VS”, “Satisfied -S”, 
“Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied - NSND”, “Dissatisfied -D”, “Very Dissatisfied - VD”, and “Totally 
Dissatisfied -TD”. Furthermore, scale dimensions were assigned a numerical value (decreasing integer 
from 6 to 0) in order to compute an average quantitative punctuation for each PM. 
The usability study involved 14 participants, a number high enough to identify most usability 
problems as justified in [8] ; and data were collected and processed through online questionnaire 
tools. All the evaluations are gathered in Figure 1a.  
The study reveals that users rate all the PMs with high punctuations in regard to “Efficiency”, 
“Effectiveness” and “Error Tolerance”. Rating values are in most cases close to 5 over 6 and no 
significant variance exists between the evaluations of the different managers.  However, important 
differences between arise when users rate the PMs according to the features of “Engaging” and “Easy 
to Learn”. For these latter aspects we can see a difference of more than two points between the highest 
and lowest rated PM, being KeePass the worst evaluated manager in both categories . Furthermore, 
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it is to highlight the generally positive nature of the evaluation: no PM gets an average evaluation 
under 3 points in any of the 5 E’s. 
From the usability analysis we conclude that users show acceptance of PMs, so moving towards the 
adoption of this technology is a good choice to enhance passwords-based authentication in the short 
term, especially in the enterprise arena. Nevertheless, it is crucial that the PM selected by a 
corporation to be used by employees is engaging and has an easy learning process in order to make 
the transition smoother. Comparative results are graphically summarized in Figure 1a, where it can 
be seen that Dashlane outstands over the rest of the analyzed PMs. 
a) Usability comparison 
b) Security comparison 
Figure 1: Comparative analysis of the usability (a) and security (b) of PMs. 
Security Analysis  
For the security study we decided to use a heuristic evaluation approach and analyze the PMs based 
on their compliance level to widely-accepted security guidelines, more specifically we build on NIST 
guidelines covered in [9] and [10] . The set of criteria that guide the evaluation process are based on 
the general PM architecture, considering the weak points where security must be enforced: 
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 Security of the Master Key. Since the Master Key gives access to all user passwords stored in 
the PM, it must be strong enough to prevent leaks and attacks. We check: 1) if the PMs impose 
a mandatory minimum length for the Master Key; 2) if the PMs force the users to create strong 
Master Keys by applying a secure policy; and 3) if the Master Key is securely stored. 
 Security of the Credentials Database. This is the valuable asset protected by the PM. We check: 
1) the strength of the algorithm used for encrypting the database, 2) if the PMs give 
quantitative or qualitative feedback on the security level of the stored passwords, 3) if the 
PMs are able to automatically generate strong passwords on behalf of the users, 4) if 
multifactor authentication is permitted, and 5) if the PMs allow to schedule password 
validity periods and generate new password when the configured passwords expire. 
 Security of the Communications. Security must be guaranteed when communicating credentials 
between PMs and applications using passwords. We evaluate: 1) the communication security 
between PMs and external cloud servers; and 2) the communication security between PMs 
and browser plugins. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the security study, which are also graphically represented in Figure 
1b. In order to compare the different PMs, we have assigned quantitative values to each criterion. 
The majority of the criteria are evaluated using a binary scale so they are given a value equal to 1 if 
the security feature is supported and 0 otherwise. For those criteria were a security algorithm in use 
must be specified, we use a continuous scale [0-1] and assign the value depending on the algorithm 
strength according to well established security recommendations in [9] [10] . 
According to the information gathered during the study, the security of the Master Key is protected 
in all the analyzed PMs in relation to criterion SM#3: the Master Key is never stored, neither locally 
nor in cloud servers. Instead, a Password-based Key Derivation function is used, which consists of 
applying a pseudorandom function (hash, cipher, or HMAC) to the Master Key along with a salt 
value and repeating the process many times in order to obtain a derived key to be used in the rest of 
PM operations. The added computational work makes password cracking much more difficult, and 
is known as key stretching. However, only Dashlane provides additional security measures for 
securing the Master Key. This PM forces the user to choose a password with minimum length 8 
characters, including an upper case letter, a lower case letter and a number. This policy leads to an 
increased entropy value of the selected word, and so security against brute force attacks is enhanced. 
In regard to the security level of the credentials database all the PMs provide comparable solutions, 
supporting AES with 256 bits key as cipher, which are the algorithm and key size currently 
recommended for the highest security. The only difference in this security category lies on the 
support of automatic scheduling of passwords, only provided by Keepass and LastPass. This feature 
is important because it facilitates an easy way to limit the validity of passwords, and frequent changes 
of passwords lead to better security since exposure is shorter in time. 
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Security Goal Criterion DASHLANE KEEPASS LASTPASS 1PASSWORD 
Security of the Master 
Key 
(SM) 
SM#1. Minimum mandatory 
length 
YES  
(1) 
NO  
(0) 
NO 
 (0) 
NO  
(0) 
SM#2. Forces user to apply 
policy for strong Master Key 
YES  
(1) 
NO  
(0) 
NO  
(0) 
NO 
(0)  
SM#3. Master Key securely 
stored 
YES 
 (1) 
YES  
(1) 
YES 
 (1) 
YES  
(1) 
Security of the 
Credentials Database 
(SDDBB) 
SBBDD#1. 
Algorithm used for DDBB 
encryption  
AES, 256 bits key 
(1) 
AES/Twofish, 
256 bits key 
(1) 
AES, 256 bits key 
(1) 
AES 256, bits key 
(1) 
SBBDD#2. Does the PM give 
feedback on the security level of 
the stored passwords? 
YES  
(1) 
YES 
(1) 
YES 
(1) 
YES 
(1) 
SBBDD#3. 
Automatic generation of strong 
passwords on behalf of the users 
YES 
(1) 
YES 
(1) 
YES 
(1) 
YES 
(1) 
SBBDD#4. Multifactor 
authentication  
YES 
(1)   
YES 
(1) 
YES 
(1) 
YES1  
(1) 
SBBDD#5. Capability of 
scheduling password validity 
periods and generating new 
passwords upon expiration.  
NO 
(0) 
YES 
(1) 
YES 
(1) 
NO 
(0) 
Security of the 
Communications 
(SC) 
SC#1. Security of the 
communication algorithm 
between PM and external 
servers  
HTTPS with 
TLSv1 2, AES 128 
and Ephemeral 
Diffie Hellman  
(1) 
Not 
Applicable 
(NA) 
HTTPS with 
TLSv1.2, AES 128 
and Ephemeral 
Diffie Hellman 
(1) 
Not Applicable 
(NA) 
SC#2. Security of the 
communication algorithm 
between PM-browser plugin 
 
AES 256 
(1) 
Not 
Applicable 
 (NA) 
Not Applicable 
(NA) 
Not Applicable 
(NA) 
Table 1: Security evaluation of PMs. Quantitative value is given inside parentheses for each criteria.  
1 Only for MAC OS and iOS   
Finally, the security level of the communications exposes some differences. On the one side, only 
Dashlane and LastPass provide on-cloud storage. For these two PMs, communication with the 
storage servers is secured using HTTPS with cryptographic algorithms currently considered as 
highly secure. More specifically, the protocol version is TLSv1.2 using with AES for confidentiality 
combined with ephemeral Diffie-Hellman for key exchange between client and server. This kind of 
ciphersuites provide perfect forward secrecy, ensuring long-term confidentiality of the session, i.e.,  
the compromise of a long-term private key used in deriving a session key subsequent to the 
derivation does not cause the compromise of the session key. On the other side, while all the PMs 
support browser plugins, only Dashlane provides public documentation about the security of the 
communication between plugin and application (based on AES-256). 
Figure 1b shows the security comparison and the total quantitative security evaluation given to each 
PM. It is to note that we have not included the SC dimension in the comparison because some features 
were not supported by all the applications, or there was missing information. However, since cloud 
storage and plugins are additional functionalities that are not required to have a fully functional PM, 
we can look at this comparison as a security evaluation of the core PM functionality. As we can see 
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in Figure 1b, the best Security Score is obtained by Dashlane, with a 1.8 out of 2. Nevertheless, it is 
important to highlight that all the evaluated PMs demonstrate good general security features, being 
the lowest security score 1.13 points out of 2.   
Conclusions and Future Lines 
We have analyzed and compared the most popular PMs with free version regarding usability and 
security and observed two interesting facts: usability is perceived in a very positive way by users, 
and all the analyzed PMs demonstrate architectures that are theoretically secure according to current 
best-practice recommendations.   More specifically, Dashlane offers the best combination of security 
and usability characteristics.  
Previous related works, such as [7] , showed a user perception of poorer usability, probably because 
PM applications were still emerging. Nevertheless, the present study reveals that PMs have reached 
a level of maturity that is adequate to consider successful mass adoption for both personal and 
corporate environments. In regard to the latter scenario, there are some future research lines that 
would boost the adoption of PMs, namely: investigation on how to automatically integrate and 
enforce company security policies with PMs; combination with SSO technologies highly used inside 
corporate environments, such as SAML and OAuth; and research on usability improvements by 
merging implicit authentication with PMs as mechanisms for substituting the Master Key.  Finally, 
as future work we would like to develop automatic testing tools that evaluate the security of PMs 
empirically in order to complement the theoretical analysis given in this paper and cover specific 
attack scenarios and vulnerabilities as described in [11] .  
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